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This paper proposes a new framework for analysis of recent
judicial trends in IP-related licensing and post-sale restrictions. It
suggests that recent decisions have allowed IP holders to use such
restrictions in order to expand the scope of their IP rights, and that
such expansion has been allowed without examining its effects on
innovation and creativity--and, subsequently, on competition in the
market. The paper focuses on one instance of such expansion: the
recognition of a right of integrity in software in the U.S. v. Microsoft
decision. Following a brief presentation of the special characteristics
of the software industry and the history of the right of integrity under
U.S. law, the paper proceeds to present the main economic
justifications for an abstract right of integrity and, building on these
justifications, proposes a set of substantive tests that should be
applied by courts before a right of integrity is applied to new subject
matter. The paper then applies these substantive tests to demonstrate
the undesirability-from an economic perspective-of the application
of a right of integrity to software.
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INTRODUCTION
None of the evidence received by the Commission suggests that
affording copyright to programs would in any way permit program
authors to monopolize the market for their products... [In any
case] the effect of program copyright on the retail prices of
consumer goods and services is so small as to be undetectable.
Conclusions of the National Commission on New Technology
Uses of Copyrighted Works, 23 (1978).
The law at the intersection between antitrust and intellectual
property (IP) is a mess. Faced with the task of balancing one statutory
policy that is aimed at promoting innovation and creativity, with
another that is aimed at promoting free competition in the market, the
courts are at a loss.1 Lacking a clear theory to support this balancing
exercise 2 , they have no choice but to sidestep the issue altogether or,
alternatively, revert to a series of alleged truisms that lack any clear
justification under either IP or antitrust policies. Thus, in many IP-
related antitrust decisions, reason stops where market power begins.
One instance where antitrust and IP concerns often clash is in the
field of IP licensing, when IP owners use restrictive licensing terms to
exert control over the conduct of authorized users of their IP. 3
Clearly, some of these restrictions are anticompetitive. Nevertheless,
the social costs associated with reduced competition are not only
tolerated by the IP laws, but presumed by them.4 Therefore, antitrust
policy cannot be allowed simply to trump IP law whenever such
1. Members of the legal academy have proposed a number of solutions, however a
definitive methodology is yet to emerge. For an overview of the different approaches, see
Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002).
2. It should be noted that the problem is not only one of theory, but also one of
application. As Louis Kaplow noted over two decades ago, "in practice, the untangling of the
myriad strands in the patent-antitrust conflict might prove impossibly difficult." Louis Kaplow,
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (1984).
3. For the purposes of the present paper, I do not attempt to distinguish between
conditional licenses and conditional sales.
4. The assumption underlying IP laws is, of course, that the costs associated with
reduced competition (at least in the short term) are offset by the incentives that supracompetitive
profits provide for socially-beneficial innovation or creativity: "If the government grants a firm
a monopoly precisely in order to evoke greater expenditures by the firm than competition
would-this is the economic rationale of the patent laws-the resulting transformation of
expected monopoly gains into social costs does not create a net social loss" RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 17 (2d ed. 2001).
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restrictions are imposed, since this would altogether undermine the
rationale underlying IP law. On the other hand, it seems safe to
assume that the legislature never intended IP rights to trump all
antitrust concerns, as would be the case if IP owners were completely
immune from antitrust scrutiny and free to impose any restriction they
desire on the buyers/licensees of their IP. 5 The call for a balancing
test in these situations therefore seems clear-the very same balancing
test that the courts and academics have been trying to find, as yet to
no avail.
But is this elusive balancing test really required in all instances
where restrictions are imposed? Indeed, a balance may be necessary
where the restrictions are essential to the appropriability of the IP in
question, as in the case of restrictions against reproduction of
copyrighted works. Such restrictions are crucial elements of the
incentivizing mechanism embodied in IP rights. However, as this
paper demonstrates, many restrictions have very little to do with
appropriability, or with incentives to innovate or create. In these
situations, a balancing test is arguably superfluous; the restriction
serves no policy goals that should be balanced against those of the
antitrust laws.
So far, the forgoing distinction has failed to resonate in the
courts. Courts apply the balancing test, whatever it may be, whenever
they are faced with any restriction that they broadly categorize as a
matter of IP-i.e. that can be enforced through a claim for
infringement of IP rights-as distinct from a merely contractual
covenant that can be enforced only in a claim for breach of contract.
However, in making this categorization, courts have paid little or no
attention to the economic effects of the restrictions, whether they
promote innovation or not.
This paper attempts to demonstrate the negative effect of this
lack of economic analysis. Restrictions that serve no innovation-
related purpose may nevertheless be miscategorized as a matter of IP.
They are then subjected to a misconstrued balancing test, and are
subsequently enforced (or upheld, as the case may be) despite being
found to have an anticompetitive effect. Thus, miscategorization
induces courts to condone conduct that promotes neither innovation
5. "It is... well settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the
patentee any exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent
monopoly." U.S. v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948). See also Kaplow, supra note
2, at 1817: "At a minimum, it seems clear that a firm having one otherwise insignificant patent
may not freely engage in price fixing, mergers, predatory pricing, or anything else it wishes
solely on that account."
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nor competition. This paper will also demonstrate the kind of analysis
courts should apply when facing new types of restrictions. The thrust
of the argument will be that unless the proposed analysis
demonstrates a clear need for property-like protection of any given
restriction in order to further innovation or creativity,6 the restriction
should not be categorized as a matter of IP law, should not be
enforced in claims for IP infringement, and should not be examined
for anticompetitive effect under a balancing test. Instead, the
restriction should be categorized as a matter of contract law, it should
be enforced in actions for breach of contract, and its enforcement
should be subject to standard antitrust scrutiny.
Unfortunately, this argument goes directly against recent trends
in the IP fields. In fact, the rights enjoyed by owners of IP have been
gradually expanded in recent years, mainly through judicial action, 7
without any regard to the costs associated with this expansion. In a
nutshell, courts have been increasingly willing to categorize licensing
restrictions and post-sale restrictions as an exercise of IP rights, thus
allowing enforcement of such restrictions through claims for
infringement of these rights, rather than through claims for breach of
contract.
The examples for this expansive trend are numerous, and they
take on different legal shapes and forms. Take, for example, the
copyright field. The 1976 Copyright Act grants the copyright holder
very limited exclusive rights. 8 The Act defines an infringement of
copyright as a violation of "any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided [in the Act]." 9 The Act further
incorporates the first sale doctrine, which denies copyright holders the
right to impose restrictions concerning the resale of copyrighted
products.l 0 The conventional thinking used to be that together, these
6. Clearly, I do not propose that courts should second guess the legislature on the issue
of core IP rights, such as the right to copy a patented or copyrighted product; my argument is
limited to these situations where the restrictions are aimed at expanding the IP right beyond
these core protections.
7. One notable exception to the judicial expansion is the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), which added Chapter 12 to 17 U.S.C. and substantially
enhanced the protection afforded to copyright holders, especially in the context of digital piracy,
by introducing prohibitions against the distribution of 'cracking' devices aimed at the removal
of anti-piracy technologies.
8. Namely the right to reproduce the work, the right to create derivative works, the right
to distribute the work and-in the case of certain types of works-the right to publicly display
the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2005).
10. The copyright holder may set the terms by which she sells the copyrighted product,
but not the terms of subsequent sales of the same product, thereby limiting the exclusive right to
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statutory provisions stood for the proposition that any restriction
concerning the use of a copyrighted product," as well as any post-
sale restriction concerning the resale of such product, had to be
enforced as a matter of contract law or not at all; a licensor could
never enforce such restrictions through a claim for copyright
infringement. 12
Today, this proposition no longer holds true-at least not in all
cases, and not before all courts. In recent years, courts have allowed
enforcement of resale restrictions through claims for copyright
infringement, thus allowing copyright holders to use so-called
licenses to circumvent the first sale doctrine and reducing the
sale/licensing distinction to a labeling formality. 13 In other cases,
courts have allowed enforcement of certain use restrictions through
claims for copyright infringement, even though these restrictions had
nothing to do with the enumerated exclusive copyrights. 14 In
distribute the copyrighted product. The doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). It was codified as § 41 of the 1909 Copyright Act,
and subsequently incorporated as § 109 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
11. Other than restrictions that pertained directly to one of the enumerated exclusive
rights, such as a restriction against public performance of a literary work.
12. Traditionally, a copyright licensor was deemed to have altogether "given up... the
right to sue [a licensee] for copyright infringement" for conduct which falls under the licensing
agreement, even when in breach of some condition thereof, and retained such right only
regarding conduct which fell beyond the scope of the license as a matter of IP law, i.e. which
infringed one of the enumerated rights; Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th
Cir. 1990). Thus, a licensor of a play to a Broadway producer could not sue the producer for
copyright infringement if the producer hired a different actor than the one agreed upon to play
the main role in the play; however, the writer could sue the producer for copyright infringement
if the license was limited to the production of a Broadway show, and the producer instead
produced a movie based on the play.
13. See for example Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp.
208, (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); cf
DSC Commc'ns. Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). But see
Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 1997) (later
vacated for unrelated reasons); Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
14. Some courts have justified this by finding the breach of certain restrictions to have
voided the license altogether, because the restriction was a condition precedent to the entire
licensing agreement; See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
10.15[A], at 115-16 n.6 (2005) and the cases mentioned there. Other courts have done this by
reading certain 'ancillary' rights into the statutorily-enumerated exclusive rights, thus directly
expanding the scope of copyrights-which is probably the approach taken in Gilliam v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), a decision that receives much closer attention later in
this paper. Finally, some courts have simply (mis)applied precedent, without proffering any
further justification, as was the case in Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586 (9th Cir.
1993): "Under well-settled copyright law, Rano would be able to claim copyright infringement
if Sipa exceeded the scope of the licensing agreement, see, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886
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summary, courts have allowed copyright holders to enforce
restrictions that go well beyond the pale of their enumerated exclusive
rights through claims for copyright infringement, thus recognizing
such restrictions as an integral part of the exercise of the copyright. 15
Furthermore, while so far the cases representing this trend have been
relatively few-and therefore the scope of this trend is not yet clear-
some recent voices from academia have called for an opening of all
floodgates, by allowing all use restrictions to be imposed as a matter
of IP law, rather than contract law. 16
To demonstrate the potential danger of this approach, the
discussion will focus on a case that needs little introduction: the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia's decision in U.S. v.
Microsoft.17 The case is widely considered the most important, most
controversial and most widely publicized antitrust case decided by
any U.S. court in recent years. In its long and detailed decision, the
Court affirmed the District Court's main finding-that Microsoft had
F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989), breached a covenant or condition, see, e.g., Fantastic Fakes,
Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1981), or breached the agreement in such
a substantial and material way as to justify rescission. See e.g., Affiliated Hosp. Prod. Inc. v.
Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1186 (2d Cir. 1975). Moreover, he could sue in state
court under a breach of contract theory."
15. It should be noted that this trend is not unique to copyright. In the patent field, the
Supreme Court has expanded the Bobbs-Merrill rationale and declared that the first sale of a
patented product exhausts the rights of the patentee regarding both vending (as in copyright) and
using the particular product, thus creating the patent first sale doctrine, commonly referred to as
the patent exhaustion doctrine. For example, Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The Federal Circuit has
eroded this doctrine to the point where it is all but dead, by declaring it to be merely a default
rule that can be avoided through express restrictive provisions. By doing so, the Federal Circuit
allowed patent holders to impose any post sale restrictions on the use of their patented product,
as well as enforce such restrictions through a claim for patent infringement, subject only to a
vague "Rule of Reason" test. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). It should be noted that the extension of the first sale doctrine to restrictions on use
was never carried over from the patent field back to the copyright field. This is probably due to
the fact that under copyright law, the copyright owner did not have an exclusive right to use the
work, whereas a patentee has the right to exclude all others from making, using, offering to sell
or selling the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005). Therefore, under traditional
copyright doctrine, restrictions on use could not be enforced as a matter of copyright law to
begin with; as mentioned in the text accompanying the previous footnote, this perception no
longer holds true in all cases.
16. See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004).
Robinson argues that when the restriction has anticompetitive effects, "forbidding the restriction
as a matter of property law is harmless, but it is also unnecessary since antitrust policy provides
a completely sufficient grounds for withholding legal enforcement of the restrictions .. ." Id. at
1453. As already mentioned, and as this paper demonstrates, this argument fails because once an
IP right had been recognized-the courts inevitably embark on a 'balancing' test under which at
least some anticompetitive conduct would be allowed.
17. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Appeal), 253 F.3d 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
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violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly in
the market for operating systems (OS) for Intel-based-personal-
computers (PC), which Microsoft enjoyed a near perfect monopoly
position through its Windows OS (Windows).18 Most antitrust aspects
of the case received much attention in the legal world, as well as in
the media in general. The aspect I focus on, however, was almost
completely overlooked: the Court's ruling on the argument that
Microsoft's licensing agreements with Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM) were sheltered from antitrust scrutiny,, because
they were nothing more than Microsoft's legitimate exercise of its
copyright in Windows. 19 The Court rejected the broad rule argued for
by Microsoft, but instead adopted a narrower rule, under which
Microsoft had the right to restrict "substantial alteration" of Windows
as part of its copyright. 20 The court then went on to apply a balancing
test under which it struck down some of Microsoft's licensing
restrictions while upholding others, despite recognizing their
anticompetitive effects.
The right to restrict alteration of creative works is not unheard of
in the copyright field. It is usually referred to as a right of integrity,
and is categorized as part of an author's "moral rights. '21 However,
moral rights-including the right of integrity-were never fully
recognized under U.S. law; they have never been applied, in the U.S.
or outside of it, to software, and they were certainly never allowed to
trump antitrust concerns. Worst of all, they serve no clear pro-
18. In a nutshell, in the part that is relevant to this paper the court found that Microsoft
maintained its monopoly by denying to a new competitive threat-middleware-access to all
the major distribution channels in the market, thus raising an insurmountable barrier to entry
before the new competitor. The court found middleware-such as Netscape's Navigator and
Sun's Java-to be a competitive threat to Windows because eventually, if middleware was to be
properly developed and effectively enter the market, it could be used as a platform on which
end-users could run applications regardless of the underlying OS they had installed. Thus,
middleware had the prospect of attracting applications developers away from Windows, eroding
the 'applications barrier to entry' into the OS market, and eventually allowing new entries into
the OS market. See id. at 55, 59-60.
19. OEM is the term used in the computer industry to refer to manufacturers of personal
computer systems, such as Hewlett-Packard, Dell, IBM and Gateway.
20. Microsoft Appeal, 253 F.3d at 63. In other words, the court recognized Microsoft's
right to impose restrictions on the use of Windows in its licensing agreement. It should be noted
that the court never questioned the labeling of the transaction as a license, instead of a sale. See
infra note 45.
21. Alterations that are so substantial as to create a new original work could be
characterized as derivative work under § 106(2) of the Copyright Act. However, works are
usually deemed to be derivative only when they are separate from the original underlying work;
thus, the translation of a book would be considered a derivative work, whereas the reframing of
a picture would not. See also the discussion infra note 77, and the cases mentioned there.
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innovation or pro-competitive policy when applied to software. Thus,
the lack of a reasoned approach to IP licensing has led the D.C.
Circuit, in its attempt to balance competition and innovation concerns,
to condone conduct that promotes neither.
Parts I and II of the paper lay out the factual and legal
background for the Microsoft case; the economic realities of the
software industry and the pressures that lead software manufacturers
to impose restrictions on the use of their software through restrictive
licensing agreements. Part III describes the specific restrictions
implemented by Microsoft in its Windows licensing agreements with
OEMs, and the District Court's and Court of Appeals' analyses of
these restrictions. Part IV provides a general overview of the right of
integrity, its origins and its status under U.S. law. Part V examines the
legal consequences of the introduction of a right of integrity into the
realm of computer software. In this part, I suggest that the application
of a right of integrity to software cannot be justified by any of the
traditional, non-economic justifications for such a right. Part VI
proposes an economic analysis of the right of integrity, aimed at
determining the economic effects of its application to software. The
analysis begins with a presentation of the best former economic
analysis of the right of integrity. I will argue that this analysis is
inherently incomplete, and suggest additional steps that should be
taken to evaluate the implications of the application of the right of
integrity to new subject matter. I will then apply the proposed analysis
to software. Finally, in Part VII, I will use the proposed economic
analysis to revisit and reevaluate the Microsoft decision.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
Over the past few decades the software industry has undergone
dramatic changes. Packaged software was nearly an unknown
commodity less than 30 years ago. 22 Today it is a widely available
consumer product; the core of one of the world's newest, biggest and
fastest growing industries. A brief overview of the evolution of the
industry is necessary to appreciate the legal and economic realities
that led to the Microsoft decision.
22. The term "packaged software" is widely used in the software industry, and usually
refers to any software product that is sold as a standalone product, i.e. not in conjunction with
any dedicated software. While the term dates back to the 1970's, when software products were
literally packaged, today many of these products are distributed online, either as a sole
distribution channel or as an alternative to buying the software in a packaged form (e.g., on a
CD). Needless to say, the analysis holds as to any standalone software product, regardless of its
method of distribution.
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Software, of course, is not a standalone product; it is a product
used in conjunction with hardware, i.e. computers. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the commercialization of software closely followed
that of computers. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the
software and hardware industries evolved from what was historically
one unified industry, and that the two industries are commingled to
this very day. Strategic alliances between software and hardware
manufacturers are common;23 many companies are active in both
industries, 24 and in some areas, software and hardware products are
partially interchangeable and therefore compete for the same
consumers.
25
When computers were first introduced into the market, there was
no separate software industry. The first computers were slow,
cumbersome and expensive machines, pre-programmed to perform
very few specific tasks. The programs used on these machines were
generally custom made by the producer of the machine itself, loaded
into the machine before it was shipped to the end-user, usually itself a
large corporation, and used only on that specific machine. 26
General-purpose "consumer" computers, capable of running
many different programs that perform different tasks, appeared on the
23. The alliances between Intel-the world's leading microprocessor manufacturer-and
Sun Microsystems, and between Intel and Microsoft were discussed in Microsoft Appeal, 253
F.3d at 77.
24. Perhaps because of the smaller capital needed to enter the software market, some
major software companies (such as Oracle, SAP AG and Computer Associates) manufacture
only software, while major hardware manufacturers (such as IBM, Intel and Dell) offer some
software products. In this respect, Microsoft may be the exception to the rule, as it currently
attempts to enter some niche hardware markets (most notably the markets for home wireless
networking and for video game consoles).
25. This phenomenon is not very common in the home-computer segment of the market,
yet very common in the microprocessor-based appliance markets. Manufacturers of such
appliances, from washing machines to cellular phones, are constantly being presented with a
choice between Field Programmable Devices (FPD), processing devices with differing levels of
programmability, the functionality of which is determined by the appliance manufacturer
according to the programming it uses, and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC),
which are non-programmable chips designed and manufactured to perform a certain function.
FPDs and ASICs are generally interchangeable, but each present different efficiencies: FPDs are
"off the shelf' mass produced products; ASICs are usually cheaper to manufacture and perform
better (as they are specifically designed for the task at hand), but they are less flexible, cannot be
adapted for future developments and require significant investment in design by the
manufacturer.
26. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES (CONTU), FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS II
(1978), http://www.digital-law-online.com/CONTU [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
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market only in the mid 1970s. 27 The availability of such computers
created demand for programs that would meet the different
preferences and requirements of an ever-growing number of computer
users. This demand, coupled with the realization that computer
programming required different skills from those needed for computer
design and manufacturing, as well as substantially less capital
investment, set the stage for the separation of the two functions and
the emergence of an entirely new industry, dedicated solely to the
manufacture of computer software.
Arguably the most notable step in the evolution of the software
industry-and the one most crucial to our discussion-occurred in
1980, when IBM, then the heavyweight of the computer industry,
approached Microsoft, a small software company, and hired its
services for developing the OS for IBM's revolutionary PC project,
which was to be launched on the market the following year. The
commercial potential of software products was not yet clear at the
time; the best-selling software product to that date sold around
600,000 copies worldwide. Nevertheless, in a stroke of prophetic
genius, Microsoft negotiated with IBM an agreement whereby
Microsoft retained all the rights to the OS it developed for the IBM
PC, including the right to sell it independently of IBM in the open
market.
The release of the IBM PC in August 1981 changed the
landscape of the entire computer industry. The PC was the first IBM
computer that was built around off-the-shelf components, most
notably Intel's 8088 microprocessor. The availability of the Intel
microprocessor and MS-DOS to other manufacturers led to the
introduction of IBM PC compatibles and, within less than a decade, to
the standardization of a major part of the computer world around the
Intel-Microsoft design. This standardization, coupled with the
relatively low price of the IBM PC and its compatibles, led to a huge
growth in the number of computers and computer programs sold over
the following years, 28 and to the emergence of Microsoft as the
27. The first home/small office computers appeared on the market as kits in 1975-1976.
Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs introduced the Apple II computer in 1977. For a brief summary
of the evolution of the personal computer see Mary Bellis, The History of Computers,
http://inventors.about.com/librarylblcoindex.htm?PM=ss 12_inventors (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
28. The total number of computers in the U.S. crossed the 1,000,000 mark in 1980; in
1983 it crossed the 10,000,000 mark; in 1986 it crossed the 30,000,000 mark. As for sales
figures, in 1980 about 486,000 small computers were sold in the U.S.; by 1990 that number rose
to approximately 14,560,000 small computers; in 2004, U.S. sales were estimated at 58,000,000,
with worldwide sales of about 177,000,000 units. See Compu-pedia, History of Computers - the
1980's,
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industry giant enjoying considerable monopoly power in the market
for operating systems for Intel-based PCs. 29
Today the software industry has an immense impact on the U.S.
economy. A conservative evaluation shows that the software
industry's sales have risen from close to nothing in the mid 1970s to
about $61.7 billion in 1997 and to over $103.7 billion in 2002,30
making it an immensely important industry in economic terms.31
Therefore, judicial and legislative decisions that alter the level of
protection awarded to software products, and subsequently alter the
level of innovation and competition in the software market, are bound
to have a significant effect on the U.S. market as a whole.
II. THE PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE
The economic viability of the software industry depends on legal
rules that protect software manufacturers from unauthorized
duplication of their products. The need for such protection flows from
http://www.vvm.com/-jhunt/compupedia/History/20f/2Computers/history-fcomputers -
1980.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005); W.E. Steinmueller, The U.S. Software Industry: an
Analysis and Interpretive History (1995),
http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/rmpdf/1995/rml995-009.pdf, Press Release, IDC, PC
Market Expected To Grow By 10% In 2005, According To IDC (Dec. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerld=pr2004 12 07 084711 (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
29. So-called Intel-based PCs include PCs containing Intel-compatible microprocessors.
The Intel-based PCs compose nearly the entire PC market. The only significant PCs not based
on Intel-compatible microprocessors are Apple PCs, which hold approximately 2% of the global
PC market and 3% of the U.S. PC market. See Eric Bangeman, Dell still king of the market
share hill, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 18, 2005, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20050118-
4535.html?63083. Approximately 95% of all Intel-based PCs are shipped to the end customer
with 'Microsoft's Windows OS pre-installed. See ZDNet Research, 5% of all PCs in 2004
shipped with Linux, http://www.itfacts.biz/index.phpid=P1299 (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
30. The dollar amounts represent gross receipts in each respective year for the software
publishing industry. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS INDUSTRY REPORT -
SOFTWARE PUBLISHING, (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0251i06.pdf.
It should be noted that these figures probably understate the true economic significance of the
software industry, for a number of reasons. First, they do not include receipts associated with
Internet publishing and the provision of Internet services (Internet access, search engines etc.).
The inclusion of these would add another $90bn to the receipts for the year 2002. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS, I tbl. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/advance/TABLEI.HTM. Second, they do not take
account of the overwhelming effects of the software industry on the performance of industries
that use software as an input.
31. The Business Software Alliance, for instance, claims that by 1997 the software
industry has become the industry with the second largest contribution to the US economy. See
BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, FORECASTING A ROBUST FUTURE: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF
THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1999), available at
http://global.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleases/upload/Forecasting-a-Robust-Future-An-Economic-
study-of-the-U-S-Software-lndustry.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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the extreme disproportionality between the cost of developing
software and the cost of duplicating software products; the costs
associated with the development of a commercial computer program
are immense, whereas the marginal cost of producing copies of the
same program is minimal. Any owner of a software CD can usually
manufacture numerous true copies of any software using a CD burner;
alternatively, such a user can distribute the software over the Internet
and make it available to millions of users at once. Free riding on the
efforts of the manufacturer is, therefore, extremely easy and often
extremely lucrative. If software developers are to recoup their
investment, such free riding must be monitored.
Of course, this cost structure is not unique to software
products. 32 It is typical of intangible goods that are non-rivalrous and
non-excludable by nature, and traditionally cited as the main
justification for the creation of IP rights, which transform what would
otherwise be a public good into exploitable private property. 33
Therefore, since the first days of the software industry, software
developers have sought to extend existing IP rights, and the protection
associated with them, to the new technology they create.34 But even
though Congress recognized the need for protection of computer
software even before the industry emerged as a separate commercial
force, the method for extending such protection was initially far from
clear. 35 The main problem seems to have revolved around the
traditional IP distinction between functional ideas and creative
expression. 36 Computer programs typically represent afunctional idea
32. While the phenomenon may not be unique, software products do arguably present an
extreme case. The Business Software Alliance estimates that as of 2004, 35% of all software
applications installed worldwide (and 22% of all applications installed in the U.S.) were
installed from unauthorized copies of software. See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SECOND
ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2005), available at
http://download.microsoft.com/download/F/0/3/F034C5EE-7E49-402A-9D5C-
BD81CI DOAF94/IDC-Piracy%/o20Study.pdf.
33. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
34. The Register of Copyrights announced as early as 1965-a decade before the first
packaged software product appeared on the market-that computer programs would be accepted
for registration, provided that they (i) contained sufficient original authorship; (ii) had been
published; (iii) copies submitted were in human-readable form. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
CIRCULAR 3 ID (1965).
35. The need for an examination of the IP rights in computer programs became apparent
to Congress as early as 1967. On October of that year the Senate passed the first bill providing
for the establishment of CONTU. Political disagreements resulted in the passage of the Act only
7 years later, on Dec. 31, 1974 (Pub. L. 93-573). See CONTU REPORT, supra note 26, at 3-4.
36. The distinction is used to differentiate between the realm of copyright law (protection
of expression) and that of patent law (protection of useful, novel and nonobvious ideas). See
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). The distinction was adopted by the legislature. See 17
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that is expressed in written code; they are neither a pure idea, nor a
pure form of expression. These hybrid characteristics do not fit
comfortably into either patent law or copyright law, and therefore
pose an ongoing challenge to traditional IP doctrine. 37
In the patent field, computer programs were not recognized as
eligible for patenting until very recently. 38 Even after the removal of
this obstacle, a programmer seeking to patent a computer program is
required to show that the program is novel and non-obvious; 39 most
computer programs simply cannot overcome these hurdles, since their
core ideas are usually neither.40
Because of the difficulty associated with patenting, the most
common protection used for software is that of copyright. In 1980
Congress amended the Copyright Act and expressly acknowledged
the applicability of copyright to computer programs, thus removing
any previously existing doubts regarding the availability of such
protection to software products. 41 Since then, the use of copyright for
software has become ubiquitous. However, traditional copyright
protection is limited in scope. As its name suggests, it is focused first
and foremost on the prevention of unauthorized copying of the
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005), which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work."
37. Some courts have acknowledged these difficulties. See for example Computer
Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) and Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 588 (1978). These rulings were later distinguished by the Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), and all but overruled by the Federal Circuit in State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court did not take up the question for further review since State St. However, in response to
State St., Congress enacted the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2005),
which rectified some of the consequences of State St. but did not reverse its core holding
regarding the general eligibility of computer programs for patenting. See also AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
39. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2005). The applicant would also have to show utility. However,
the standard for utility was set so low by the courts, that it will presumably be met by any
commercial software. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
40. These requirements have also been relaxed over the years; however, since most
computer programs represent incremental improvements over existing ideas, it would seem that
patent protection would be available to a relatively small number of programs.
41. The amendment did not specifically add software to the list of works of authorship
that appears in § 102 of the Copyright Act; instead, it merely added a definition of computer
program to § 101 of the Act, and further added § 117 of the Act, which allowed the duplication
of computer programs in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, i.e., the
general protection of the Act. The amendment reflects an adoption of the CONTU
recommendations. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2005).
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program. It is also limited to a set of enumerated exclusive rights,
including mainly the right to reproduce the program, to create
"derivative works" of the program, and to distribute the program.42
As such, copyright protection would generally apply only to the
expressive elements of any computer program, as they are fixed in a
tangible medium, and not the functionality of such program.43
Therefore, certain conduct, most notably "reverse engineering" of the
program, is not traditionally considered to be within the ambit of
copyright protection. Thus, as long as there is no actual copying of the
underlying code and structure of the program, there is no
infringement of any of the enumerated rights of the copyright holder.
While reverse engineering clearly requires considerably more effort
than the simple copying of programs, there would still be some
instances where it would allow competitors to gain a competitive
advantage, or to take a free ride, depending on one's point of view, on
some of the original developer's programming efforts, as well as on
its marketing efforts.44
Naturally, software manufacturers seek to extend the limited
protection they receive under traditional copyright law. The
mechanism of choice to attain such extra protection appears to be the
licensing agreement, 45 which today comes standard with virtually any
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
43. Courts have applied a methodology of abstraction, whereby "a computer program can
often be parsed into at least six levels of generally declining abstraction: (i) the main purpose,
(ii) the program structure or architecture, (iii) modules, (iv) algorithms and data structures, (v)
source code, and (vi) object code". Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823,
835 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 706-07. These levels of
abstraction form a spectrum of protectibility, with the purpose/functionality of a program
representing an idea that is never protectible, the code representing protectible expression, and
the elements occupying the middle ground-structure, sequence, etc.-receiving limited
protection, depending on their nature. See id. at 836.
44. Even if "reverse engineering" gives no technological advantage because it is too
difficult, it is clear that it would only be applied to successful software-software that had
already proved its marketability-thus reducing the risk associated with the enterprise.
45. As briefly explained in the introduction, licensing is used mainly for the purpose of
circumventing the first sale doctrine, which prohibits the imposition of post-sale restrictions on
resale of copies of copyrighted works. The scope of, and justification for, the first sale doctrine
and the licensing/sale distinction lie beyond the scope of this paper, and deserve separate
analysis. For present purposes, the main point is that many software manufacturers claim that
their software is never 'sold', but merely licensed, to any end-user. For example, Adobe posted
the following notice on its licensing webpage: "Adobe products are not sold; rather, copies of
Adobe products ... are licensed all the way through the distribution channel to the end-user."
Adobe Sys., Inc., Adobe Product License Agreements, http://www.adobe.com/products/eulas
(last visited Jan. 10, 2006). The practice of labeling transactions as licenses instead of sales was
rejected by the Supreme Court in the distant past. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach., 243 U.S.
490 (1917). Today, in the context of software, some courts have taken a different view. See
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software product. These licenses use multiple techniques to protect
the functionality of the software from being copied or altered: some
stipulate that parts of the program are trade secrets of the licensor,46
some prohibit decompiling the program, some prohibit reverse-
engineering of the program, and so forth.47
These licensing agreements arguably provide more protection for
software products and software manufacturers than the limited rights
enumerated in the Copyright Act. Naturally, this extra protection may
come at a cost. In this case, the cost is decreased competition in the
market for software products, or in a specific segment thereof. The
question arises, therefore, whether these restrictive licensing
agreements are necessary to promote innovation, or whether they
stifle competition without generating any offsetting social value. The
answer to this question may vary according to the specific provision
under consideration, the structure of the market, and the efficacy of
copyright alone to prevent predatory free riding.
In the following sections, I will examine the restrictions used in
Microsoft's licensing agreement with OEMs. First, I will present the
District Court's and the D.C. Circuit's approach to these restrictions. I
will then try to evaluate the analysis from a conceptual perspective
and an economic one. Finally, I will suggest some broader
Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) also seems to reduce the distinction to a
question of labeling, acknowledging licenses as "the dominant contractual framework for
commerce in computer information" and broadly defining the term license as any contract that
"limits the access or uses authorized or expressly grants fewer than all rights in the information,
whether or not the transferee has title to a licensed copy," a definition which encompasses
nearly any transaction in IP products. UCITA § 102(a)(41).
46. These provisions pose numerous legal questions regarding the definition of and the
justification for trade secrets, especially regarding the ability of mass-distribution-goods to
maintain their "secretive" status through contractual mechanisms. These problems deserve
separate analysis.
47. Licensing agreements are typically long, formulaic and legalistic documents that
incorporate a large number of restrictions, bundled together in wholesale fashion. For example:
The structure, organization and code of the Software are the valuable trade
secrets and confidential information of Adobe Systems Incorporated ... you may
not modify, adapt or translate the Software. You may not reverse engineer,
decompile, disassemble or otherwise attempt to discover the source code of the
Software.... You may not unbundle the component parts of the Software for use
on different computers. You may not unbundle or repackage the software for
distribution.
Adobe Sys., Inc., Adobe Acrobat 7.0 End User Licensing Agreement,
http://www.adobe.com/products/eulas/pdfs/Acrobat WWEULACombined20040915_1630.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (emphasis added).
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conclusions regarding the correct analysis that should be applied to
such restrictions in the future.
III. MICROSOFT'S LICENSES AND THE COURTS' ANALYSIS
Microsoft's main licensees of Windows, its most significant
distribution channel of Windows to end-users, are OEMs. Microsoft
licenses Windows to all OEMs for installation on the Intel-based PC
systems they manufacture. The OEMs install Windows on these
systems, and then license (or rather sub-license) Windows to the end-
user as part of the complete system.48
The District Court for the District of Columbia has focused its
analysis on five restrictions in Microsoft's licensing agreement with
the OEMs: 49 (i) A restriction prohibiting the removal of any
Microsoft-installed icons, folders or "start" menu entries; (ii) A
restriction prohibiting the modification of the initial boot sequence;
(iii) A restriction prohibiting the installation of any self-launching
programs, including any OEM-designed user-interface that would
replace the Microsoft-designed Windows Desktop; (iv) A restriction
prohibiting the addition of icons to the Windows Desktop that are
bigger or more prominent than Microsoft's own icons; and (v) A
restriction prohibiting the use of the "Active Desktop" feature to
display third-party brands.50
Microsoft argued that the purpose of these restrictions is to
prevent the manipulation of Windows by the OEMs before it was
delivered to the end-user-in other words, to protect the integrity of
Windows. Microsoft then pressed two lines of argument to justify the
restrictions. The first was a quality-assurance argument. Microsoft
asserted that the licensing restrictions are meant to prevent OEMs
from compromising the "quality and consistency" of the Windows
configuration delivered to end-users, and that such quality-control
measures are necessary because there would be "little incentive to
develop a high-quality operating system product if OEMs were free to
alter it for the worse before handing it over to consumers. '51
48. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Findings of Fact), 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13, 10
(D.D.C. 1999).
49. The Court focused its analysis only on those restrictions that it found relevant to
Microsoft's battle against Netscape; the agreement probably included further restrictions. See id.
at 58-68, 202-38.
50. Active Desktop is a feature that was introduced by Microsoft as part of Internet
Explorer 4.0 software, allowing users to incorporate web pages into the Windows Desktop.
Microsoft Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 61, 1 213.
51. Id. at 64-65.
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The second argument related to Microsoft's IP rights in the
software. Microsoft argued that the Copyright Act "endows the holder
of a valid copyright in software with an absolute right to prevent
licensees, in this case OEMs, from shipping modified versions of its
products without its express permission," and that its licensing
restrictions simply restate its right to "preserve the 'integrity' of its
copyrighted software against any 'distortion', 'truncation' or
'alteration. "',52
The District Court rejected Microsoft's quality-assurance
argument on factual grounds. The Court found that Microsoft's main
purpose in the restrictions was to prevent, or at least deter OEMs from
pre-installing Netscape Navigator on their system. The Court found
that Microsoft feared that the installation of Netscape Navigator on
many PC systems would diminish the barriers-to-entry into the Intel-
Compatible-PC operating system market, and would therefore pose a
competitive threat to Microsoft's dominant position in that market,
and not, as Microsoft argued, a threat to the quality or consistency of
the Windows configuration that is delivered to end-users. 53 The Court
based its rejection of Microsoft's argument on several findings, most
notably, Microsoft's requirement in the OEM licensing agreement
that the OEMs themselves, and not Microsoft, bear all the costs
associated with customer support for Windows-installed systems,54 as
well as on the fact that on several occasions Microsoft did permit
several OEMs to perform certain alterations to Windows (even
though these were essentially identical to the alterations that were
prohibited under the licensing agreement), provided that these
alterations would not include the installation of Netscape Navigator. 55
52. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Conclusions of Law), 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40
(D.D.C. 2000) (emphasis added).
53. The entire analysis of the competitive threat that Netscape Navigator (as well as other
"middleware") poses to Microsoft's position in the OS market is beyond the scope of this paper;
for a concise summary see Microsoft Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d, at 28-30, 68.
54. Therefore, the court concluded that any alterations that would be detrimental to the
quality or consistency of the operating system would result in "consumer wrath [that] will fall
first upon the OEM," and therefore "any OEM that tries to force an unwanted, low-quality shell
on consumers will do so at its own peril." Microsoft Findings of Fact, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 65,
225.
55. Id. at 65, 223. To make the picture complete, it should be noted that several major
OEMs such as HP, IBM and Gateway objected to Microsoft's license restrictions and were
forced to accept them only for lack of an alternative OS to Windows. These objections were
made clear in testimony and in letters that were entered into evidence, where some OEMs made
it clear that "If we had a choice of another [OS] supplier, based on your actions in this area, [we]
assure you [that you] would not be our supplier of choice." Id. at 62, 214.
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The District Court also rejected Microsoft's second line of
argument-the right of integrity argument. The District Court found
that Microsoft's alleged right of integrity is not one of the enumerated
rights that are explicitly granted to copyright holders under the
Copyright Act, and that therefore it is doubtful that such a right
exists. 56 The Court went on to conclude that, while some courts have
recognized the right of a copyright holder to preserve the integrity of
artistic works despite the lack of an enumerated right to that effect,
they have done so only in situations that raised no antitrust concerns,
thus rendering them inapposite to the case at hand.57 Finally, the
Court ruled that even if Microsoft had any right to protect the
integrity of its Windows OS under copyright law, this right would not
shield Microsoft from antitrust liability if it were used to promote
anticompetitive purposes.
Whatever may be said of the first two arguments raised by the
District Court, this last argument seems clearly wrong, as it would
suggest that antitrust law completely trumps IP law, rendering any
attempt to balance the two policies superfluous. If IP is to serve any
purpose at all, IP rights must allow their owners to engage in at least
some forms of anticompetitive conduct; that is the whole point of the
right to exclude others from certain types of conduct. Thus, for
example, it is clear that Microsoft could prevent OEMs from simply
making copies of Windows for the purpose of distributing them in the
56. Microsoft Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40. The Court relied for this
conclusion on Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155 (1975), in which the
Supreme Court held that "if an unlicensed use of a copyrighted work does not conflict with an
'exclusive' right conferred by the statute, it is no infringement of the holder's rights." Id.
(emphasis added). It should be noted that while the District Court's result was probably correct,
its reasoning is hard to justify. Aiken was a case of a restaurateur who played music that was
broadcast on the radio to the patrons of his restaurant; it is hard to see how one might analogize
such unlicensed use with a use that goes against an express term of an IP license (assuming-as
the District Court has-that Microsoft's agreement with the OEMs was, in fact, a license). As
was previously noted, at least some courts have found that within the context of a copyright
license, the licensor may impose some restrictions that go beyond the enumerated rights
conferred by the copyright statute, and that are nevertheless an exercise of the copyright and not
merely a contractual issue. See cases cited supra note 14.
57. Microsoft Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40 n.2. The Court referred to Gilliam
and WGN Cont'l. Broad. v. United Video, 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982). This line of argument,
adopted also by the Court of Appeals (albeit in a qualified version), seems to reverse the issue
completely. The question of existence of a right should precede the antitrust analysis; antitrust
concerns may affect the scope of the right in a specific situation, but certainly not its very
existence.
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market, regardless of the fact that this action would clearly enhance
competition in the market for Intel-based-PC operating systems.58
The decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue does not fare
any better. The Court of Appeals also addressed both prongs of
Microsoft's defense of its licensing agreements to OEMs. 59 As for the
quality-assurance prong, the Court largely affirmed the District
Court's findings. However, the Court of Appeals diverged on the
analysis of Microsoft's integrity argument. Unlike the District Court,
the Court of Appeals did not ponder over the "enumerated rights"
analysis at all, thus sidestepping the issue altogether. Instead, the
Court first acknowledged the holdings in two earlier cases, Gilliam
and WGN, to the effect that they "limit a licensee's ability to engage
in significant and deleterious alterations of a copyrighted work."'60
Next, the Court stated that the relevance of these decisions is limited
for two reasons: First, since they apply only to "substantial
alterations"; and second, since they were decided within contexts that
raised no anticompetitive concerns. 61
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did decide to apply the
Gilliam standard. The Court found that the only licensing restriction
aimed at preventing a "substantial alteration" was the one prohibiting
the installation by OEMs of a self-launching user interface that would
entirely replace the Windows Desktop. The Court then summarized
its position as follows: "we agree that a shell that automatically
prevents the Windows Desktop from ever being seen by the user is a
drastic alteration of Microsoft's copyrighted work, and outweighs the
marginal anticompetitive effect of prohibiting the OEMs from
substituting a different interface automatically upon the completion of
the initial boot process. '62
58. It is not surprising that one writer described the District Court's decision on
Microsoft's IP argument in the following way: "The district court... drew meaningless
distinctions with analogous cases (i.e., whether antitrust claims are part of a lawsuit has no
bearing on the policies supporting a right of integrity) and ignored the fundamental nature of the
intellectual property laws, which, by definition, promote welfare through exclusion.... In short,
the district court improperly failed to take account of the purposes underlying the intellectual
property laws." Carrier, supra note 1, at 786.
59. On appeal, Microsoft also pressed a broader claim, arguing that any licensing
restriction is per-se legal, because "if intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired...
[then] their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability." The Court summarily
dismissed this argument as one that "borders upon the frivolous." Microsoft Appeal, 253 F.3d at
63.
60. Id. A comprehensive overview of Gilliam is presented infra Part IV.B.
61. As explained earlier, this distinction is hardly satisfactory. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
62. Microsoft Appeal, 253 F.3d at 63 (emphasis added).
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Ultimately, the Court of Appeals allowed Microsoft to continue
with a conduct that it found to be anticompetitive, albeit marginally
so. Apparently, it did so because it felt obligated to balance the
anticompetitive effect of the conduct with some vague notion
regarding Microsoft's IP rights in Windows. This notion remained
vague because the Court sidestepped every major IP question it had to
resolve in order to reach a reasoned conclusion--questions such as
whether Gilliam extended copyright protection beyond the statutory
scope, if so, whether the expansion was justified as a matter of IP
doctrine or public policy; and if so, whether the Gilliam rationale,
predicated on the unique facts of that case, 63 was applicable to a
Microsoft-type situation. Having sidestepped these questions, the
Court's finding of an IP right of integrity forced it to apply a
balancing test that can only be characterized as vague and unreasoned.
The Court never explained (1) why the installation of a different user
interface is a substantial alteration of Microsoft's copyrighted work,64
(2) why only substantial alterations deserve protection, whereas
insubstantial alterations would be allowed, (3) why the right of
integrity would be protected only in situations where its
anticompetitive effects are "marginal," and (4) why it considers the
effects in the specific case to be marginal or what criteria should be
applied to determine the marginality of anticompetitive effects. Some
of these neglected issues will be taken up in the next sections.
IV. THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY - LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Moral Rights
The right of integrity in copyrighted works was first recognized
in France, as part of a distinct body of rights: Le Droit Moral, or
Moral Rights. 65 Some form of moral rights has been recognized by
French courts for over 150 years, 66 and the concept evolved over the
63. See infra Part IV.13.
64. Arguably, Microsoft's copyright is in the underlying code for Windows, and not in the
appearance of the Windows user interface. However, from the record, it does not appear that any
evidence were presented regarding the extent of changes made to the Windows source code in
any of the processes prohibited by the restrictive licenses.
65. The French use of the singular form is predicated on the concept of a unified,
indivisible body of right(s). See NIMMER, supra note 14 at § 8D.01 n.4.
66. Despite the usual perception of continental law as codified law, moral rights are by
and large an original creation of the French courts. See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator
of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1026 (1976). See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of
Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 555
(1940).
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years to include the right of attribution (or "paternity"), the right of
integrity, the right of withdrawal, the right of divulgation and more.
Following in the footsteps of the French courts, similar rights have
been recognized in most Continental jurisdictions.
As developed by the French courts, traditional moral rights
attach to copyrightable works. They are, however, different and
distinct from copyright. While copyright is intended to protect the
economic rights of the copyright owner, be it the author or any of her
assignees, moral rights were developed in order to protect some form
of residual interest the original author or artist maintains in her
creative work even after she has assigned all other rights in the work,
including copyright, to others. 67 Under French law, this residual
interest flows from the unique connection between the author and her
creative work, which is a personal, rather than an economic,
connection. The underlying assumption is that creative works reflect
their authors' personalities, and that these are therefore entitled to
protection above and beyond that of copyrights; protection against
any injury to the author's "personality" interest. 68 As such, in most
Continental jurisdictions moral rights have certain unique
characteristics that set them apart from copyright: Moral rights are
usually inalienable, i.e. they remain with the author even after
copyright has been transferred to another (or never belonged to the
author, such as in the case of "works for hire"); they are perpetual;
and they are imprescriptible. 69
The Continental development of moral rights did not spawn an
analogous legal development in common law jurisdictions. At least
initially, common law courts in general, and U.S. courts in particular,
rejected the notion that authors hold any rights in their work other
than copyright, and were outright hostile to the notion that an author
may have any residual interest in her work once sold off to another. 70
67. 1 use the terms "author" and "artist" freely to describe any creator of creative
copyrightable works.
68. See Roeder, supra note 66 at 557: "When an artist creates ... he does more than bring
into the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world
part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use. There are possibilities of
injury to the creator other than merely economic ones; these the copyright statute does not
protect." See also Merryman, supra note 66 at 1025.
69. See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 8D-6.
70. For example, Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in City of New York, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949): "The claim of this plaintiff that an artist retains rights in his work after
it has been unconditionally sold, where such rights are related to the protection of his artistic
reputation, is not supported by the decisions of our courts."
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Some attempts have been made to change the common law
approach to the issue. Most notably, in 1928 moral rights were
incorporated into Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (The Convention). 71 The
Convention calls upon member states to adopt legislation that would
protect authors' rights of attribution and integrity. The success of this
initiative has, however, been questionable. The U.S. refused
accession to the Convention for over 60 years following the adopti6n
of Article 6bis. To a large extent, this was specifically because Article
6bis dictates the introduction of moral rights into member-states'
jurisdictions. Although the attitudes of some courts and state
legislatures towards moral rights shifted somewhat during those 60
years, 72 no express federal statutory provision was adopted that would
introduce moral rights into U.S. federal law. When the Senate finally
voted for adherence to the Convention in 1988, it did so only after
Congress had enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 (BCIA), which explicitly denies any change in the U.S.
domestic legal situation concerning moral rights. 73
Therefore, both before and after the adoption of the BCIA, the
status of moral rights under U.S. law was questionable at best. With
71. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, art. 6bis, para. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-
27 (1986):
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
72. So far, ten states have adopted some form of moral rights statute, most notably
California and New York. All the state statutes are limited to the protection of works of visual
art, and therefore do not apply to software. Furthermore, even as applied to works of visual arts,
these statutes raise considerable constitutional concerns in light of the express pre-emption
clause regarding moral rights in works of visual art included in section 605 of the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 301(0 (2005).
73. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988). The Act nevertheless opens with a declaration that U.S. law-AS IS-satisfies the
obligations of the U.S. under the Convention. In making this declaration Congress seems to have
relied heavily on the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention (hereinafter The Ad Hoc Committee), which are questionable at best. The Ad Hoc
Committee based its conclusions on questionable ground, such as the lack of protection for
moral rights in other Berne jurisdictions, particularly Australia and the UK. See The Ad Hoc
Committee, Preliminary Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 183, 214
(1986). Most commentators have criticized the Ad Hoc Committee's conclusions, as well as the
declaration in the BCIA. See R.S. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention. The
MoralRights Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 196, 204-05 (1988); Nimmer, supra note 14, at 8D-
21.
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the exception of limited moral rights recognized under the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, the general existence of such rights, their
jurisprudential origin and their scope were all unclear. 74 Some
commentators concluded that such rights simply do not exist under
U.S. law. 75 Several commentators found some form of integrity right
in § 106(2) of the Copyright Act, which recognizes the extension of
copyright to derivative works.76 That section had been heavily relied
upon by the Ad Hoc Committee and, arguably, by Congress, as a
source of a right that is equivalent to the right of integrity for
purposes of adherence to the Convention. However, this reading of §
106(2) has been repeatedly rejected by most courts. 77 Finally, since
1976, most courts and commentators-as well as the Court of
Appeals in Microsoft-have found Gilliam and its progeny to be the
source of moral rights under U.S. law. A brief discussion of that
decision is therefore in order.
B. The Gilliam Doctrine
Gilliam involved a motion for a preliminary injunction brought
by the members of Monty Python, seeking to enjoin ABC from
broadcasting an edited and abridged version of their show "Monty
74. Regardless of the BCIA declaration, in 1990 Congress took corrective steps and
adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. The Act amended the Copyright Act to recognize
limited and alienable attribution and integrity rights in authors of works of visual art-paintings,
drawings, sculptures and still photographic images-that exist in up to 200 copies. The Act does
not apply to works made for hire or to works that are represented in numerous copies, such as
software or audiovisual works.
75. See Merryman, supra note 66.
76. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 14, at 8D-l3.
77. Most courts found that § 106(2) pertains to the creation of separate works that are
themselves subject to copyright. See, e.g., Lee v. AR.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997).
In Lee, discussing the reframing of a copyrighted postcard, Judge Easterbrook noted that if one
were to adopt the suggested construction of § 106(2) as encompassing any changes made to the
copyrighted object, that would mean that "the United States has established through the back
door an extraordinarily broad version of authors' moral rights, under which artists may block
any modification of their works of which they disapprove. No European version of droit moral
goes this far. Until recently it was accepted wisdom that the United States did not enforce any
claim of moral rights; even bowdlerization of a work was permitted unless the modifications
produced a new work so different that it infringed the exclusive right under § 106(2)." Id.
(emphasis added). For a contrasting approach see Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque AR.T.
Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit's approach in Mirage remained unique in
the landscape of American jurisprudence, and was subsequently questioned even in decisions of
the Ninth Circuit itself See Cort v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
2002). It is worth noting that the argument that the prohibited alterations to Windows would
amount to a derivative work was never discussed by either the District Court or the Court of
Appeals, and was apparently never raised by Microsoft.
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Python's Flying Circus. '78 The editing was done in order to make
time for commercial breaks and to remove materials that ABC found
to be offensive or obscene. 79 Ultimately, 24 minutes were edited out
of the 90-minute show; the court found that "the truncated version at
times omitted the climax of the skits to which appellants' rare brand
of humor was leading and at other times deleted essential elements in
the schematic development of a story line." 80
Monty Python had written the original script for the show. It then
licensed the BBC to record the show, to broadcast it in the U.K., and
to license it for broadcasting elsewhere. The license specifically
allowed the BBC to alter the scripts before recording the show, on
condition of consultation with the writers prior to the implementation
of any changes, the license agreement was silent regarding post-
recording alterations, but stated that Monty Python retained all rights
in the script.81
The BBC recorded the shows, and consequently licensed ABC to
broadcast them in the U.S. However, under the BBC-ABC license
agreement, ABC was specifically permitted by the BBC to edit the
recorded show "for insertion of commercials, applicable censorship or
governmental ... rules and regulations, and National Association of
Broadcasters and time segment requirements. '82 This provision made
the question of Monty Python's property-like right of integrity acute
for the outcome of the case: ABC had no contractual obligation to
refrain from editing the show, the BBC could not prevent the
broadcast of the mutilated version of the show, and Monty Python had
no privity with ABC. 83
The Second Circuit found two causes of action that justified the
grant of a preliminary injunction. First, the Court found that the
silence of Monty Python's license to the BBC concerning post-
recording alterations meant that such alterations were not allowed
under that license; and since "a grantor [the BBC] may not convey
greater rights than it owns,"'84 any alterations made by ABC, as sub-
licensee, amounted to infringement of Monty Python's copyright in
78. For the sake of clarity I will refer to Monty Python and its members collectively
simply as Monty Python.
79. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1976).
80. Id. at 25.
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Clearly, Monty Python could sue the BBC for breach of contract; however this would
not necessarily prevent further broadcasting of the mutilated version of the show by ABC.
84. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21.
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the script. 85 The Court based its conclusion on an analogy between
license provisions that restrict use of the work in other media, or that
limit the period of the license, and license provisions that restrict
alteration of the work.86 In reaching its conclusion the Court made no
reference to moral rights in general or to the right of integrity in
particular. The entire analysis was supposedly made under the
auspices of copyright law.
Second, the court addressed an argument that relied directly on
Monty Python's moral rights. Monty Python argued that ABC was
not allowed to attribute to Monty Python a "mutilated" version of its
creation. 87 Strangely enough, for what has since been deemed the
cornerstone decision for moral rights in the U.S., the Court began its
analysis of this argument by stating that U.S. law "does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the
law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights
of authors."'88 However, the Court then went on to find that the facts
of the case stated a cause of action under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act,89 because ABC's broadcast of the edited show falsely
represented the edited show as originating from Monty Python. This
reasoning suggests that the Court recognized a right analogous to a
right of attribution, rather than an integrity right. However, the Court
muddied the waters as follows: "We therefore agree with Judge
Lasker's conclusion that the edited version broadcast by ABC
85. As previously mentioned, this assertion is incorrect as a matter of general copyright
law. Under copyright law, a breach of a licensing term is also an infringement of the copyright
only if the breach infringes one of the statutory enumerated rights or-in some courts-if the
restriction can be read as a condition precedent to the entire licensing agreement. See supra note
14 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the possibility that the edited version of the
show amounted to derivative work was not discussed-and apparently not raised-in Gilliam.
86. The analogy used by the Court can hardly justify the Court's ultimate conclusion. This
does not mean that the conclusion itself is wrong; as explained below, it just serves to show the
lack of doctrinal analysis of moral rights. The Court took note of the fact that the two
restrictions are simply not analogous as a matter of traditional copyright law: One kind of
licensing restriction, the media/time restrictions, pertains to exclusive rights that are expressly
enumerated in the Copyright Act and clearly serves the economic exploitation of the work; the
other restriction, the alteration restriction, is not recognized by the Copyright Act, and serves
primarily "to ensure that the copyright proprietor retains a veto power over revisions desired for
the ... work." Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
87. It is not completely clear from the decision whether the focus of the argument is on
Monty Python's attribution right, integrity right, or both.
88. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
89. The section, which is usually considered to be part of trademark and unfair
competition law, prohibits any use in commerce of words or marks whose use amounts to "false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact" and is likely to cause consumer confusion.
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impaired the integrity of appellants' work and represented to the
public as the product of appellants what was actually a mere
caricature of their talents."90
At first glance, it would seem that both Gilliam prongs have
similar effects; both introduced some form of moral rights into U.S.
law, whether through the expansion of copyright law or of unfair
competition doctrines. But in fact, the rights created by each prong
are very different in scope and character.
The first prong of Gilliam recognized a right of integrity under
copyright. This kind of integrity right is very different from the
Continental droit moral, for two reasons. First, the right is arguably
alienable; while the Gilliam case was brought by the authors of the
original script, nothing in Gilliam suggests that Monty Python could
not contract away its right to mutilate the work, or that such a contract
would not be enforceable. A more difficult question is whether Monty
Python could license this right to the BBC, who could then withhold
it from or grant it to its sub-licensees, as it deemed fit; however, the
Court's reference to the "copyright proprietor['s] ... veto power over
revisions" suggests that the answer to this question is also positive.91
Second, the right is arguably not perpetual; copyright has a definitive
expiration date,92 and the Gilliam right of integrity under the first
prong would expire with it.
In contrast, the second prong of Gilliam goes much further
toward a Continental model of moral rights. The emphasis of the
Court-and of § 43(a)-is on the misrepresentation of Monty
Python's talents by the showing of a mutilated version of its work.
The right to prevent such misrepresentation is certainly inalienable;
the misrepresentation concerns Monty Python directly, and not any of
its licensees or assignees, such as the BBC.93 The right is also
perpetual: even after the work enters the public domain, its mutilation
will still misrepresent Monty Python's talents.
In light of this analysis, it seems clear that from a doctrinal legal
perspective, regardless of policy considerations, Gilliam 's first prong
represents a very small step away from traditional common law
90. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25 (emphasis added).
91. Still another question regards the proprietorship in the right in the case of works-for-
hire; as a general rule, under common law all the rights in the work would lie with the
employer/beneficiary of the work, and not with the actual author. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2005).
Again, the question was never raised in Gilliam.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2005).
93. Month Python could probably assign the right to sue for such a misrepresentation, but
not the actual right not to be misrepresented.
246 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 22
approaches; all it does is offer a slightly broader interpretation of the
exclusive rights under copyright. It is therefore not surprising that
Gilliam's first prong was followed in some subsequent decisions-
most notably WGN. Furthermore, as already mentioned, some
commentators refer to this part of the decision as the doctrinal basis
for the right of integrity under U.S. copyright law.94
In contrast, Gilliam's second prong enjoyed very little success in
subsequent decisions.95 One of the few cases in which a full-blown
moral right was invoked under Gilliam's second prong was the
Microsoft case itself. Microsoft argued for a § 43(a) right of integrity
in a motion for summary judgment before the District Court, asserting
its right to prevent the sale of mutilated versions of Windows under
its name. In an unpublished decision that is not dissimilar to its final
ruling on the merits, the District Court rejected the argument while
questioning the soundness of Gilliam and the applicability of moral
rights to software; 96 apparently, Microsoft did not appeal that
decision. 97
94. See Nimmer, Supra note 14, § 8D.04[A][1]. Other commentators see the decision as a
frail basis for the introduction of moral rights into U.S. law: "one school of thought holds that by
stitching together the paternity cases, the visual art statutes, Gilliam, and other scraps and
fragments, we can fashion a loincloth, or at least a G-string, that will cover our moral rights
nakedness." Brown, supra note 73, at 204. Yet other commentators warned against the
introduction of moral rights as a mere extension of copyright, and suggested that such rights
should only be introduced through sui generis legislation. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1128-29 (1990).
95. At least when it comes to a positive right of attribution. See also infra note 97.
Nevertheless, the theory underlying Gilliam had some success in cases where authors asked for
the removal of attribution. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
96. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *16 (D.D.C.
1998).
97. Five years later, in 2003, the Supreme Court had finally taken up the question, and in a
unanimous decision declined to recognize moral rights of attribution under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: "In sum, reading the phrase "origin of goods" in the Lanham Act in accordance
with the Act's common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or
creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the
phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.... To hold otherwise would
be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which
Congress may not do." Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37
(2003) (emphasis added). This decision clearly settles Microsoft's § 43(a) argument against
changes made to the boot sequence of Windows, because it was predicated on the fact that these
changes removed all mention of Microsoft from the desktop. However, it should be noted that
the Court did not directly address the question presented in Gilliam, i.e. whether attribution to an
author that is misleading may give rise to a claim under § 43(a).
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V. RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN SOFTWARE: A CONCEPTUAL AND
PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS
A. Generally
In the preceding parts, I have distinguished between two distinct
concepts of moral rights. The first is the extreme Continental concept
of perpetual, inalienable rights that lie with the original author of any
creative work (for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these rights as
Continental moral rights). The second is the more modest concept of
an alienable right of integrity that functions as an extension of
copyright (I will refer to this right as a Gilliam right, invoking
Gilliam's first prong). As I have previously explained, while most
courts have found Continental moral rights inapposite to traditional
principles of U.S. law, some courts have been willing to recognize a
limited Gilliam right in certain situations. However, none of the pre-
Microsoft decisions have recognized a Gilliam right in software. This
raises two questions: First, can moral rights be applied to software?
Second, should moral rights be applied to software? The first question
is both conceptual and pragmatic, and will be discussed in this part.
The discussion will begin with Continental moral rights, and follow
with an examination of Gilliam rights. The second question is one of
public policy, and will be discussed in the next part.
B. Continental Moral Rights and Software
1. The Conceptual Perspective: The Problem of Personality
As previously explained, Continental moral rights were initially
developed in response to the recognition of a personality interest of
authors in their creations. This idea is based on the assumption that
the protected works reflect their authors' personalities in some way.
However, this notion seems counterintuitive when applied to software
products, for at least two conceptual reasons.
First, software is usually developed by groups of individuals
working together. Even though copyright law is generally well
adapted to dealing with joint authorship, it was never designed to
handle the beehive-like realities of the modem software industry,
where joint authorship may extend to tens, hundreds, or even
thousands of programmers, each working on specific routines or sub-
routines in the final creation. This problem is further exacerbated by
the ever-growing trend towards outsourcing of the development of
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certain parts within a program. 98 The sheer number of potential
"authors" raises some pragmatic problems that will be discussed later;
for now, it is important to note that it raises critical conceptual
problems in the context of continental moral rights, simply because it
is very unclear just how much of each programmer's personality is
reflected in the final software product, if at all. 99
Second, software products are first and foremost functional
works of authorship. As was explained earlier, software
manufacturers were forced to seek the protection of copyright law for
lack of a better, sui generis, form of protection. While software
arguably meets the creativity requirements of copyright law, in
many-if not most-cases it would seem counterintuitive to say that
it reflects the personality of the programmers. What exactly do we
know about the personality of the creator of BASIC, MS-DOS, Real
Player, iTunes, Mozilla Firefox and the like? Arguably, nothing, or at
least nothing more than we know about engineers that design cars or
washing machines. 100 In fact, when we think about works that reflect
their creators' personality, intuition seems to point first and foremost
to artistic, rather than functional, works. Works of art are generally
considered highly individual, enough so to convey something that is
intimate to their creator. It is arguably exactly this notion that drove
French Courts to recognize moral rights of artists, but not those of
artisans.
2. The Pragmatic Perspective: The Problem of Software
Evolution
Another major problem that Continental moral rights would raise
if applied to software has to do with the constant evolution of
software. Software manufacturers usually do not develop their
98. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyright and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 273-74 (1988)
(Statement of Kenneth W. Dam, V.P. of IBM Corp.): "It is relevant to the moral rights 'issue'
that a significant number of the computer programs we market are acquired in whole or in part
from others. We acquire rights in programs from other companies, and we acquire rights from
individuals.... IBM would have to foot the bill, directly or indirectly, if there were claims for
any moral rights violations by any of the persons from whom we acquire rights... [a]nd if
Berne adherence had anything to do with making these claims significant, we would be...
concerned." Dam went on to argue that IBM is in fact not concerned, because-according to
Dam-the Convention did not require the introduction of Continental moral rights into U.S. law.
99. The discussion assumes proprietary software development; the problems are even
more daunting in the case of open-source code, where the development of the software is an on-
going process involving numerous developers, each adding and removing functionalities at will.
100. It should be noted that both objections refer mainly to mainstream commercial
software; they do not necessarily apply to software with distinct artistic or expressive features.
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products from scratch. Instead, after a specific program is launched,
the manufacturer usually releases several new and improved versions
of the same program before developing a completely new program. In
this way, for instance, Microsoft developed and updated its MS-DOS
software; from 1981 to 2000 Microsoft released increasingly more
complex (and arguably better) versions of its initial MS-DOS system.
Naturally, many new features were added to the system over the
years-from new commands to completely new graphic-user-
interfaces. However, the underlying program was, at least in part, the
same old MS-DOS that Microsoft had developed for the IBM PC. 101
This kind of evolutionary development process is unparalleled in
any other field of copyrightable subject matter. 102 It is completely
dependent upon the freedom of the software manufacturer to
constantly change the programs it markets. This freedom would be
undermined if Continental moral rights were to be applied to
software; the need for constant changes would directly clash with
each programmer's integrity right in the routines she had authored.
The number of programmers involved with every program would
therefore also create a pragmatic problem that would impede the
efficient development process of new and better versions of existing
software. 103
101. While the user-interface of Microsoft's OS changed dramatically over the years, all of
Microsoft's operating systems up to (and including) Windows 98 were actually built around an
MS-DOS Kernel. Windows 95 was the first OS that relieved users from the need to actually
install MS-DOS on their computer before installing Windows, but only Windows 2000 finally
abandoned the MS-DOS technology for Microsoft's NT technology. See Mary Bellis, The
Unusual History of the Microsoft Windows,
http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa080499b.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2006).
102. A somewhat analogous process might be that of encyclopedias and similar multi-
authored text books that are constantly updated. Nevertheless, these would generally pose
drastically smaller pragmatic problems, because the overall 'functionality' of the book does not
depend on any single sub-part thereof.
103. See Dam, supra note 98, at 282, stating that IBM supports adherence to the
Convention, provided there is no subsequent enactment of moral rights provisions. See also,
Hearing on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyright and Trademarks
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 60-64 (1989) (Statement of J. E. Brown). A
similar conclusion was reached by most jurisdictions that recognize moral rights and that have a
developed domestic software industry: Japanese Law was amended to provide that the right of
integrity shall not apply to modifications in software if they are intended to improve the
software's functionality; French law was amended to provide that programmers do not enjoy the
right of integrity or the right of withdrawal; similar provisions were adopted in the U.K. See J.
E. Brown, The Protection of High Technology Intellectual Property: An International
Perspective, 7 No. 12 COMPUTER LAWYER 17, n.26 (1990); Hoffman, Gross & Nawashiro
Moral Rights and Computer Software: An International Overview 5 COMPUTER LAWYER 9, 9-
13 (1988).
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C. Gilliam Rights and Software
As the preceding sections demonstrate, Continental moral rights
are inapposite to the way the software industry works. By
comparison, the application of Gilliam rights to software would seem
to pose less of a problem, at least from a pragmatic point of view.
The pragmatic problems discussed above originate, first and
foremost, from the inalienability of Continental moral rights. Once
this characteristic of the right of integrity is removed, so that the
integrity right is aligned with copyright ownership, the implications of
the right change dramatically. With Gilliam rights, the fact that many
programmers work together no longer poses pragmatic difficulties.
These individual programmers will either have no copyright in the
program to begin with, 104 or they will assign all their rights to the
software manufacturer. Under Gilliam, the assignment of copyright
would mean the assignment of the integrity right; no residual rights
would exist beyond copyright, and all the rights associated with the
copyright would lie in their entirety with the software manufacturer.
The assignment of the copyright would therefore solve the problem of
evolutionary development, because software manufacturers would
hold all the rights to their programs, and would be free to alter them,
even to the point of mutilation of the original program, as they would
deem fit.
This analysis seems straightforward enough. However, it does
not address the conceptual problems discussed before, and therefore
misses what is perhaps the most crucial question regarding Gilliam
rights: what exactly is the purpose of these rights? In other words, it is
clear that in the software context, the Gilliam right of integrity solves
many problems that plague the Continental right of integrity, but what
is it exactly that these rights achieve?
One thing is certain, Gilliam rights do not serve the purpose that
French courts sought to achieve when they conceived the concept of
moral rights, i.e. the protection of the personality interest authors have
in their creations. Gilliam rights offer extended protection to the
rights of copyright holders, whether or not they are the authors of the
copyrighted work. As the Microsoft decision made abundantly clear,
in the software context this protection would generally be extended to
a corporation without any personality to protect.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2005). In case of a work for hire, "the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author.., and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright."
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Strangely enough, the purpose of the right was never questioned
in Gilliam and its progeny, and was also largely ignored by
commentators. Of course, in Gilliam the Court was not directly faced
with the question of justification for the right it had created, because
on the facts of that case the author-Monty Python-was also the
proprietor of at least some of the copyrights. Furthermore, the Gilliam
Court clearly did protect the very real personality concerns of Monty
Python's members. However, once the D.C. Circuit extended
Gilliam's reasoning to the software industry, where authorship and
copyright are almost inherently separate and no clear personality-type
interest exists, the question crystallized. In the next part, I will inquire
as to the existence of a satisfactory answer to this question.
VI. RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN SOFTWARE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. Why an Economic Analysis?
Moral rights clearly do not address the same problems (the same
market failures) that are central to other IP rights. Moral rights have
nothing to do with the marginal cost of copying creative or innovative
work; they have nothing to do with the non-rivalrous nature of such
works.
Continental moral rights aim to protect the personal, non-
economic rights of authors. Due to the non-economic nature of these
rights, courts that have applied them usually did not examine the
resulting economic effect of their application. Instead, such courts
could simply assume that moral rights promote some non-economic
social value, and therefore their effect on innovation, creativity or
overall social welfare is irrelevant. 105
This approach can no longer be justified under Gilliam. Once we
construe moral rights to be an integral part of copyright, they must be
analyzed and justified on the same terms that apply to copyright in
general. As discussed briefly in Part II of this paper, copyright law
has one clear purpose: to promote social welfare by incentivizing
creativity. Under U.S. law, this purpose is not only the fruit of court-
made common law, but also a constitutional principle that delineates
the outer boundaries of federal copyright protection;106 any right
105. As explained below in more depth, this does not mean that moral rights cannot be
justified in terms of efficiency-only that this exercise was never undertaken by the courts.
106. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8 grants Congress the power "To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries." The Supreme Court has interpreted this language
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granted under copyright law that is systematically welfare-reducing is
arguably unconstitutional. 107 If we assume that any IP right has a
social cost, at least in some situations, then before we recognize a new
right, such as a Gilliam integrity right under copyright, we must be
able to show, by way of economic analysis, that in general this right
does indeed promote creativity, thus offsetting these costs and
ultimately increasing social welfare.
B. Previous Economic Analysis of the Right of Integrity
1. The Hansmann & Santilli Approach
Before turning to the analysis of the Gilliam right of integrity in
the software context, it is worth examining the scant economic
writing that exists about the subject of moral rights. The best attempt
at an economic analysis of moral rights seems to be that proposed by
Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli (Hansmann & Santilli). 108
While this analysis focuses on Continental moral rights in works of
visual arts, its methodology and conclusions provide a valuable
starting point for an assessment of the welfare implications of the
right of integrity and for an examination of the subject matter to
which it should apply; therefore, a brief overview of the Hansmann &
Santilli analysis is in order.
Hansmann & Santilli begin their analysis by characterizing the
right of integrity as one that creates servitudes in chattels: the right of
the original author to exercise some form of control over her work
even after that work has been sold and resold to others.
Generally, the law prohibits servitudes in chattels on efficiency
grounds. Usually, the seller of the good has no strong interest in the
as delimiting the powers of Congress to the creation of welfare-enhancing intellectual property
rights. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954): "The economic philosophy behind the
clause ... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare"; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 432 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)): "[T]he
ultimate aim [of the copyright clause] is ... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."
107. Naturally, Congress is free to grant rights to authors even if these rights do not
promote social welfare in some specific instances. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that "[tihe all-inclusive nature of the
1909 Act reflects the policy judgment that encouraging the production of wheat also requires the
protection of a good deal of chaff'). However, the grant of a right that is systematically welfare-
reducing is arguably outside the ambit of Congressional powers. See Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (in the context of patents).
108. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997).
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subsequent use of the good that would require protection, whereas
servitudes impede the use and transferability of goods and create legal
uncertainty as to the rights to use the goods. 109 Exceptions to the
general rule against servitudes are therefore recognized where these
rationales do not exist or are not as forceful, i.e. when (i) the original
seller does have an important interest in subsequent use, because
unrestricted use of the goods will have an adverse effect on her; (ii)
legal uncertainty is minimal, because subsequent purchasers can
easily be notified of the restrictions as to use; and (iii) the servitude
does not impose an unreasonable burden on subsequent uses of the
goods, because subsequent purchasers can obtain release where
appropriate.' 10 Naturally, the first of these factors is the most crucial
in any economic analysis; once a truly important interest of the
original seller is identified, it is up to the legal system to come up
with mechanisms that would minimize the costs of protecting this
interest, i.e. cost-effective notice and release mechanisms. Therefore,
the discussion will focus on the first factor. I l
Next, Hansmann & Santilli proceed to argue that integrity rights
can have an important economic role in protecting the artist's
reputation. Hansmann & Santilli suggest three ways through which
the protection of the artist's reputation may enhance social welfare.
First, from the point of view of the artist, excessive changes to the
artist's work may damage the artist's reputation and consequently
reduce the price she may charge for her other works.11 2 The right of
integrity therefore protects the future income of the artist. Second,
from the point of view of other owners of the artist's work, a
109. As mentioned before, some recent writing has questioned the viability of these
assertions. See Robinson, supra note 16. A full-blown answer to Robinson's arguments goes
well beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be noted that Robinson seems to
overlook the fact that IP rights-unlike any other property rights-are subject to clear
constitutional limitations. Therefore, it is not enough to show that their extension does not harm
efficiency-as Robinson claims-but rather one needs to prove that such extension actually
fosters innovation or creativity in ways that mere contracts would not. As the analysis in this
section demonstrates, no such showing can be made in the case of a right of integrity in
software.
110. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 108 at 101.
11. This is also the factor that is more applicable across the board: Notice and release
mechanisms are inherently industry-specific.
112. This rationale was probably recognized also by the Court in Gilliam, hence the
emphasis on protecting the way Monty Python's talents are presented to the American public; a
similar argument was advanced by Jane C. Ginsburg in her testimony before the subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice regarding the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990. See The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the
H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Propery, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101 st Cong. 80 (1989) (statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg) [hereinafter Ginsburg].
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reputation-damaging alteration of one of the artist's works may lower
the market value of the artist's entire body of works, including the
value of works that are already owned by others. Such an alteration
therefore imposes costs on other owners of the artist's work. The right
of integrity can protect against the imposition of such costs. Third,
from the point of view of the general public, works of art often
represent important elements in the community's culture; the loss of
such works would arguably deplete social welfare.
In the next part of their analysis, Hansmann & Santilli offer a
characterization of the type of works to which integrity rights should
attach. In light of their reputation-related discussion, Hansmann &
Santilli suggest that a right of integrity should be recognized only in
situations where: (i) the artist's reputation has a bearing on the value
attached to his works, i.e. the same work would be sold for a higher
price if it could be attributed to the specific artist than if it could not;
and (ii) the artist's reputation is based on the entire body of works she
has created.
As an example of the first prong, Hansmann & Santilli offer a
comparison between the drawing of a painting and the invention of
the radio. Whereas the painting's price would largely depend on the
painter's identity, "it is not important for the radio that Marconi
invented it." As an example of the second prong, Hansmann &
Santilli describe a situation where one's reputation derives from a
field other than the field of the creative work that is being altered. If a
famous politician were to sell a few of her paintings, the alteration of
only one of these paintings would probably not damage the
politician's reputation as a politician, nor would it influence the value
of her other paintings since that is derived from her celebrity-status
and not from her artistic talents.
2. Some Criticism of the Hansmann & Santilli Approach
Hansmann & Santilli's analysis seems straightforward enough
when it comes to the interests that may be protected through the right
of integrity. On the other hand, their conclusion as to the tests that
should determine the subject matter to which the right of integrity
should attach is unsatisfactory. For example, consider Hansmann &
Santilli's conclusion that Marconi is not important for radio; this
conclusion is really nothing more than a restatement of the fact that
when it comes to radios, no reputation-related interest lies with the
inventor. However, this fact alone does not mean that there is no
reputation-related interest in radios at all. Thus, while Hansmann &
Santilli's assertion that the Marconi name has no bearing on the price
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of a radio is undoubtedly true, the same cannot be said about the fact
that a specific radio was manufactured by Sony. In fact, one can
easily make the argument that Sony easily meets both tests suggested
by Hansmann & Santilli; its reputation clearly affects the price of its
products, and its reputation is affected by or based upon, its entire line
of products.
Consider another example: that of automobile manufacturers. It
seems safe to say that at least some automobile manufacturers easily
meet the two Hansmann & Santilli tests. For instance, we could safely
assume that any Audi automobile would sell for a higher price than a
comparable automobile made by a less prestigious manufacturer; 113
therefore, the price of an Audi automobile clearly depends on Audi's
reputation. On the other hand, following a "60 minutes" televised
report that aired in November 1986 and in which CBS claimed that
one specific Audi model, the automatic-shift Audi 5000, had a
tendency to accelerate out of control, killing innocent bystanders and
damaging property in the process, sales of the entire Audi range
sharply declined."l 4 Therefore, Audi's entire reputation is affected by
the reputation associated with each of the models it produces.
These examples clearly show the inadequacy of the Hansmann &
Santilli tests. These tests do little more than inquire whether the
reputation connected with some commercial good lies with whomever
the law determines to be the good's author. However, they do not
explain why the reputation of authors should be awarded the extra
protection afforded by the right of integrity, whereas the reputation of
113. In fact, outside the United States, Audi sells its cars as part of the Volkswagen
'Konzem,' which consists of Audi, Volkswagen, Skoda and Seat (as well as high-end brands
Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini). All brand names manufacture and sell some cars that are
based on the same basic design; however, each brand targets a different segment of the market,
and therefore prices its products differently. Thus, in Europe one can choose an Audi or, for
about 60% of the price, a Skoda that is made of the same basic components and that in many
cases is manufactured in the very same plant. For a brief description of the pros and cons of the
platform-sharing model used by the Volkswagen Konzern see Scott Miller, VW Sows Confusion
with Common Pattern for Models, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Oct. 25, 1999, at A25.
114. Audi's sales in the U.S. peaked in 1985 with the delivery of just over 74,000 cars.
Following the 1986 CBS broadcast and the ensuing litigation, Audi sales plummeted to well
under 20,000 cars a year between 1991 and 1995, and never reached anything like its 1985 sales
figures until 2000 (the figures are based on information obtained from Audi of America; a
summary of these figures can be found at http://www.humanspeakers.com/audi/sales.htm). This
drop in sales occurred despite numerous reports that cleared Audi of all allegations concerning
the so-called 'sudden acceleration'. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE 54-74
(1991).
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non-authors should not be awarded similar protection."15 Why should
radios or cars not be sold subject to a right of integrity? To this
question, which is paramount to our examination of the software
context, Hansmann & Santilli offer no answer.
C. Some Further Thoughts on the Applicability of the Right of
Integrity
While the Hansmann & Santilli tests offer no substantive
distinction that would justify granting integrity rights to Picasso while
denying them to Sony, both intuition and longstanding legal traditions
suggest that such distinctions do, in fact, exist. In the following
passages I will suggest three additional tests that emphasize three
such distinctions. None of the tests is conclusive. However, in
conjunction with Hansmann & Santilli's tests, they provide better
guidance as to the desirability of the application of the right of
integrity to new subject matter, such as software.
1. The Secondary Market Test
As was pointed out by Hansmann & Santilli, servitudes on
chattels can only be justified (in welfare terms) when the original
seller has an important interest in the consequent use of the goods by
subsequent purchasers. Even then, servitudes can only be justified if
the interest of the seller cannot be protected by other means at a lower
cost.
This is where the secondary market test comes into play. It is
predicated on the assumption that when the seller sells the goods
directly to the end-user, and no re-sales to third parties are expected,
i.e. no secondary market exists, the use of servitudes is superfluous.
Instead, the parties can define their relationship more efficiently
through contract. The use of contract would allow the parties to
negotiate the optimal level of integrity protection, and to price that
protection accordingly. A contract would also give clear notice to the
buyer as to her rights. 116 Therefore, the secondary market test would
115. Reputation of manufacturers is protected under trademark and unfair competition law;
however, this protection is focused on the consumer, rather than then manufacturer, and is
therefore narrower than that of a right of integrity.
116. It is important to note that the test does not require a direct sale to the end-user.
Contractual relationships would work in limited vertical chains of distribution; if protection is
important enough to the seller, it could either vertically integrate the distribution chain, or direct
its downstream distributors to contract for protection with the end-users. Creative lawyering can
ensure enforcement of such protection, either through the use of third-party beneficiary clauses
or through specific obligations of enforcement, as part of the distribution agreement.
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suggest that where no secondary market exists, the right of integrity
should not apply. 117
However, there are two reasons why the secondary market test
alone does not offer a comprehensive solution to the problem posed
by the Hansmann & Santilli tests. First, while the test draws a clear
distinction between paintings and radios (the first are expected to be
traded more or less perpetually, while the latter are expected to come
to rest with the first end-users to whom they are sold), it does not
offer any guidance as to why mass-produced goods that do have a
secondary market, such as cars, should not give rise to a right of
integrity just as paintings do. Of course, the very proposition that
automobile manufacturers should enjoy a right of integrity in their
products is counterintuitive and stands in contrast with a long line of
cases where courts were generally hostile to attempts by automobile
manufacturers to exercise control over their products after their initial
sale.118 In order to justify these intuitions and long-standing legal
traditions, further substantive distinctions must be shown to exist
between the two cases.
Second, one might argue that in cases where no secondary
market exists, the cost of servitudes is minimal. 119 Thus, the question
in these situations (or so the argument would go) boils down to how,
absent specific contractual provisions on protection of integrity, an
efficient default legal rule ought to be constructed. This is essentially
an empirical question: If we were to find that in a specific industry,
such as the radio industry, all original sellers would like to impose a
right of integrity on end-users, and all end-users would not object,
then, even without a secondary market, a legal rule recognizing such a
right would be more cost-effective than contracting for such a right
117. Another way of analyzing the effects of the lack of a secondary market would be
through its effect on the interests recognized by Hansmann & Santilli: The lack of a secondary
market would mean that reputation damage to the original seller would have no adverse effect
on current owners of goods made by the same original seller, since they would not be looking to
sell them in the future.
118. See Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (Court found
agreement requiring franchisees to use only original spare parts to amount to a tying
arrangement, but decided there was no clear error in the lower court's finding that GM had a
legitimate business purpose for such arrangement). See also U.S. v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc., 517 F.Supp. 1369 (D.C. Cal. 1981) and Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz
Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (Courts found agreements requiring the use of
original spare parts to be an illegal tying arrangement).
119. The cost of notice would be minimal, due to the proximity between the original seller
and the end buyer.
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down intricate distribution chains. Again, to answer this argument,
further distinctions must be drawn.
2. The Volume-of-Sales Test
Volume-of-sales has long been recognized as a relevant factor in
the context of moral rights. The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990,
for instance, applies moral rights to visual works that were
reproduced in no more than 200 copies. 120 Nevertheless, the
economic basis for this distinction has not been thoroughly discussed.
The volume-of-sales test is linked directly to Hansmann &
Santilli's second test, which requires that the original seller's
reputation be based on its entire body of work. The volume-of-sales
test is relevant to this issue because it affects the way changes to a
single good reflect on the original seller's reputation. If we go back to
an example used before, each of the works sold by a painter is usually
so unique, and the overall number of works produced over the
painter's life is so small compared to commercial manufacture, that
changes to one or two of the works might have an adverse effect on
the way the art world appreciates the painter's entire body of work. In
comparison, if only one or two Audi 5000s would have accelerated
out of control after their having been altered by a local mechanic, the
reasonable conclusion of the general public would have been that
Audi was not at fault; after all, thousands of other cars of the same
make and model would have been cruising along safely. 121 In other
words, the volume-of-sales factor is crucial because where it is
120. The requirement of no more than 200 copies was introduced into the Visual Artists
Rights Act as part of a political bargain that was meant to relieve the fear of major Hollywood
studios that the Act would grant moral rights in movies to directors and screenwriters-the very
same moral rights invoked by Monty Python in Gilliam. See The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1989; Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the S. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Propery, and the
Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 25 (1989) (Reply of Hon.
Edward J. Markey, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to question by Hon. Howard L.
Berman, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). It should be noted that currently, American
movie studios require that each screenwriter explicitly waive any moral rights they may have in
a script or screenplay, except a contractual right of attribution, which is subject to the credit-
attribution procedures agreed upon between the studios and the Writers Guild of America. See
STEPHEN F. BREIMER, THE SCREENWRITER'S LEGAL GUIDE 112, 160 (1995) (noting that the
studio's "basic philosophy is they pay for it, they can do whatever they want with it").
121. In the real case, the claim was that the malfunction was due to a failure by Audi itself,
and not due to any alterations made to the cars. Nevertheless, if the malfunction would occur in
a large number of cars due to an alteration made by a major Audi distributor, Audi's reputation
would probably still be harmed, even if it never sponsored or condoned the alteration.
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significantly large, only a systematic alteration to the products would
affect the original seller's reputation. 122
The volume-of-sales test solves the problem posed by non-
artistic goods that have a secondary market. It clearly shows that
when it comes to assessing the need for a right of integrity, the case of
mass-produced goods such as cars (mass-produced products with a
secondary market) is analogous to that of radios (mass produced
products without a secondary market), and differs from that of
paintings (unique products with a secondary market). Systematic
alterations to cars, of a scope that would affect the reputation of the
automobile manufacturer, cannot be made by end-users; they usually
cannot even be made by a single workshop, they can only be made by
an entity high enough in the distribution chain to have access to an
extremely large number of cars. Such an entity would typically have a
direct contractual relationship with the automobile manufacturer,
allowing the automobile manufacturer to negotiate any integrity
protection it finds beneficial-for the appropriate price and subject to
regular antitrust scrutiny.
The conclusions drawn from the volume-of-sales test do not
necessarily mean that original sellers of mass-produced products can
never have an interest in maintaining the integrity of their products
down the distribution chain, even in the hands of end-users. In fact,
over the years, many manufacturers of mass-produced products have
tried doing just that, and have offered differing justifications for doing
so. 123 However, these conclusions suggest that no such legitimate
122. It should be noted that the test refers to situations where the mass-produced articles
are identical, i.e. there is no "original", as opposed to "reproduction." Thus, a car would
generally be considered a mass-produced good, whereas Picasso's original Guernica would not,
regardless of the number of posters, postcards and reproductions of the painting were made over
time. The assumption is that where such distinction does exist, the public is aware of the
difference between the original and the reproduction; even a systematic alteration to a huge
number of Guemica reproductions would not be likely to affect Picasso's reputation. For a non-
economic discussion of the reasons for recognizing a right of integrity in an original (or limited
edition) copy even when thousands of reproductions were made. See Ginsburg, supra note 112,
at 86.
123. Automobile manufacturers, for example, have tried numerous times to control the
derivative markets for spare-parts used in their automobiles by franchisees and by end-users,
with varying degrees of success. One can propose a number of purposes that drive these
attempts:
First, they may reflect an attempt by the manufacturers to price discriminate between consumers
on the basis of usage (i.e. charge a higher overall price from high-intensity users than from low-
intensity users), a purpose that may or may not be welfare-enhancing. For example, Benjamin
Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual
Property Refusals to Deal 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003).
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interest exists as a general rule. Because the alterations made by end-
users usually have no impact on the original seller's reputation, the
imposition of restraints on the use made by end-users seems, as a
general rule, not to promote any welfare-enhancing interest of the
original seller. Therefore, the default rule in the case of such mass-
produced products should not allow the imposition of such restraints,
unless the manufacturer can show some unique justification for them.
Finally, the volume-of-sales test answers-at least partially-the
argument concerning the cost of contracting for integrity protection. If
we take the example of a contract between an automobile
manufacturer and its main distributors, clearly the cost-saving
argument loses much of its force: the parties to such contracts are
sophisticated players and therefore the distribution contracts would
typically be elaborate, finely negotiated long-term contracts; any
integrity protection would have to be tuned to reflect the role that the
specific manufacturer assigns to each specific distributor. Thus, any
default integrity rule that a legislature might devise would be
rewritten by the parties in any case, and the introduction of such a rule
would therefore serve no cost-reducing function. 124
3. The Functional / Artistic Test
The third test is perhaps the most vague of the three: the
judgment as to whether something is functional or artistic is difficult
in some cases to the point of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, the
distinction is clear in most situations, and may tilt the balance in cases
Second, automobile manufacturers may be able to extract rents through the exercise of market-
power in the derivative market whenever such extraction of rents would not result in a decrease
in demand for their automobiles, due to some informational inefficiency in the automobile
market; a similar theory was accepted by the Supreme Court in Kodak v. Image Technical
Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992), over the objection of (among others) the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., in an amicus brief it filed with the Court.
Third, automobile manufacturers may be trying to protect their reputation for quality, or reduce
the costs they incur under warranty provisions, a purpose that is arguably welfare-enhancing, as
long as the manufacturers can show that their own spare parts are of superior quality and that the
usage of inferior parts would reflect on the manufacturers reputation. See, e.g., Mozart v.
Mercedes Benz, 833 F.2d 1342. Whatever the reason for the manufacturers' interest in the
derivative market for spare parts, it cannot be assumed to be welfare-enhancing, and therefore
cannot justify a default right of integrity.
124. It should be noted that Microsoft did expressly contract with the OEMs for the
integrity of Windows. Therefore, its arguments may have been directed at an integrity right that
must be expressly invoked in a license agreement. If this is a correct inference, then the analysis
of the costs of contracting seem irrelevant to Microsoft's position, which assumes the need for
contracting anyway.
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where the previous two tests, combined with the original Hansmann
& Santilli tests, fail to produce a clear answer.
The functional/artistic test suggests two answers to the
arguments concerning the need for protection of the creator's
interests, as well as those concerning the cost of contracting for
integrity protection. 125 First, it emphasizes the greater chance for a
conflict between the original seller and subsequent buyers in the case
of works of art. This fact is critical because an integrity right plays an
important role only when the original seller and the buyer may have
conflicting views on the good sold.
In the case of a painting or a television show, for example, a
subsequent buyer of the work may feel that the work could be
improved in some way through some form of alteration. After all,
beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and artistic value is in many
senses subjective. Thus, some buyer may decide that James
Rosenquist's F- 111 would be better if the words "U.S. AIR FORCE"
were removed from it. Some buyer of a Henri Cartier-Bresson black-
and-white print might think that it could be improved by adding
colors to it. Apparently, ABC thought that Monty Python's Flying
Circus would be more appealing without the punch lines. In these
situations, the reputation interests of the original seller, namely, the
artist, conflict with the interests of the buyer. As Hansmann & Santilli
demonstrated, it is these cases that call for protection of the artist's
interests through the application of a right of integrity.126
125. The functional/artistic test also works in the realm of the third justification suggested
by Hansmann & Santilli: Where a good is functional, it arguably has no public significance.
126. Of course, most artistic works are a far cry from those produced by Rosenquist,
Cartier-Bressons or even Monty Python. A complete analysis of the desirability of attaching
moral rights to trivial works of art is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, at least two
reasons why the rights should not attach only to works of great artistic value are immediately
apparent. First, courts are ill equipped to distinguish between trivial works of art and great
works of art. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Second, many times the distinction does not become clear until a considerable period of time
has passed since the creation of the work. For instance, it is well known that Van Gogh's
greatness was not recognized during his lifetime; Rembrandt's masterpiece 'Night Watch' was
cut to fit the size of the room for which it was commissioned, and payment for the painting was
withheld due to Rembrandt's unconventional depiction of an action scene. "[S]ome works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke." Id. It seems that it is the
artist who should enjoy the benefit of the doubt during such period of time when the artistic
value of her work is not yet clear. Similar reasons were the basis for rejection of a proposal to
grant broad protection to the integrity of works of "recognized stature" when it came before
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On the other hand, in the case of a car, or a computer, or a
washing machine, the value of the goods is usually much more
objective; the good has a function, which it does or does not perform.
The value perceptions of the original seller, namely, the manufacturer,
and of the end-user, are better aligned; they both want the car, the
computer or the washing machine to work, and, as a general rule, they
want them to work in pretty much the same way. Therefore, the
original seller would usually have no residual interest in the good that
would require protection from the end-user.127
Second, the functional/artistic distinction emphasizes the
difference in scope between the maintenance and repair work that
needs to be performed on functional goods, as opposed to artistic
goods. As a general rule, functional goods require maintenance and
repair to maintain their original functionality. The scope of
maintenance and repair procedures on functional goods is, as a
general rule, extremely broad: the owner of a car is required to change
filters, tires, brake pads etc. on a regular basis, and she may need to
replace the entire engine or body panels in the case of a serious
malfunction or an accident. The owner of a computer may be required
to replace major parts such as a CPU or a hard drive. An integrity
right would put immense legal pressures on these procedures; the fine
line between service and alteration would turn the most mundane
servicing jobs into legal battlefields. The parties would have to
contract out of these restrictions, at least to some extent, in nearly
every case.
In stark contrast, any maintenance procedure that is required on
works of art is usually minimal. Traditional works of art usually
require minimal and infrequent restoration, modern works of art, that
incorporate more perishable goods, may require more maintenance
work, but still nowhere near the extent or frequency of mass-produced
products. 128 Furthermore, because of the small number of works
involved, restorations of artistic works can usually be made with the
consent and guidance of the artist (or the body that is entrusted with
Congress during the committee hearings regarding the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. H.R.
Rep. No. 101-514, at 15.
127. This section refers to end-users because the creator would usually have direct
contractual relationships with the distributors, and therefore the "cost of contracting" argument
is hardly applicable. Nevertheless, in most cases the argument works just as well with
distributors: a distributor's interests are usually also aligned with that of a manufacturer,
especially in cases such as Microsoft where the product serves as an input in the distributor's
own product.
128. Exceptions do exist where works are made from off-the-shelf products that require
just as much maintenance within the work of art as they would outside of it.
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whatever moral rights remain in the works), so there would be no
need to contract out of the right of integrity. 129 Therefore, the
application of a right of integrity to works of art would not result in
undue costs.
D. Application of the Analysis - The Case of Software
Under the preceding analysis, it is clear that a right of integrity
should not, as a general rule, be applied to software. It is true that
some software manufacturers meet the Hansmann & Santilli tests.
Arguably, Microsoft's reputation is strong enough to have a bearing
on the software products that it sells; Microsoft's reputation is
probably affected by the entire line of products that it sells. However,
all the additional distinctions offered in the preceding section suggest
that any integrity right in software would not foster creativity or be
welfare-enhancing.
Software is not traded in any secondary market; its distribution is
done either directly to the end-user (in the case of on-line sales) or
through a short vertical distribution chain (such as the use of OEMs
by Microsoft). Packaged software is a mass-produced product, with a
huge volume of sales. Software is functional, rather than artistic. The
"servicing" rationale of the functional/artistic test seems particularly
crucial in this instance, because software does not require mere
service, but actual adaptation to other software that is installed on the
computer and to new hardware that is installed. 130
Two questions, however, must still be answered. The first
question is whether the fact that software is supposedly "licensed,"
rather than sold, affects the analysis in any way. The second question
is whether the application of a Gilliam integrity right, rather than a
Continental integrity right, would affect the analysis. I believe that the
answer to both these questions is no.
As for the first question, and as mentioned earlier in this paper,
courts in the copyright field have eroded the licensing/sale doctrine to
129. For some examples of the challenges facing curators and conservators and their
cooperation with artists when handling such issues see F. Couture, Riexposer ou produire
l "oeuvre l 'originale ? / To Re-exhibit or To Produce the Original Work?, 71 ESPACE 6 (2005).
130. Programs interact with each other, and thus "alter" each other, on a regular basis. On
any computer station at Columbia Law School, for instance, Microsoft Word has icons for the
creation of Adobe Acrobat PDF files and for looking up references on Westlaw and Lexis-
Nexis; Many computer users have Google or Yahoo toolbars installed on their web browser;
Symantec's Norton Antivirus and a host of other programs change the Windows boot sequence
and registry so that they may be launched automatically. Arguably, any of these changes might
infringe a strictly-applied right of integrity.
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a mere labeling exercise. Whether this trend is justified is a question
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for present purposes,
even if we do assume that Microsoft licenses Windows rather than
sells it, the distinction makes no economic difference. Regardless of
the type of transaction used, packaged software products leave the
hands of their manufacturers and end up in the possession of the
distributors and subsequently the users. The only detrimental
economic effect an alteration of the software may have on its
manufacturer is the reputation-related damage recognized by
Hansmann & Santilli. As was clearly demonstrated by the other tests,
this interest requires no property-type protection. Furthermore, such
protection would be utterly detrimental if imposed as a default rule. 131
As for the second question, again it would seem that nothing in
Gilliam changes any of the rationales recognized by Hansmann &
Santilli or any of the tests devised in this paper. Gilliam has allegedly
recognized an integrity right that does not necessarily lie with the
author, but rather with the copyright proprietor-in this case, with the
software manufacturer. While Hansmann & Santilli assumed that the
right would lie only in authors, their analysis did not suggest any
substantive justification for that rule other than it being the historic
rule of Continental moral rights. On the contrary, under their analysis,
the rights could lie just as easily with software manufacturers or even
car manufacturers. This flaw in the Hansmann & Santilli analysis is
rectified through the introduction of the additional tests. These do not
assume the scope or nature of the right of integrity; instead, they are
used to determine the welfare implications of a right of integrity in
any given case, and from that to determine the right's applicability.
Therefore, these tests question the application of what is essentially
an abstract integrity right, which is neither a Continental nor a Gilliam
one. The conclusion of the analysis is therefore unaffected by the type
of integrity right that is under examination.
VII. MICROSOFT REVISITED
The Microsoft Court accepted Microsoft's right of integrity
argument without any analysis of its consequences; it simply referred
to Gilliam and (mis)applied it. In doing so, the Court not only
overlooked basic IP questions, but also a number of problems that are
unique to Microsoft's product and method of distribution, and that go
131. Contracting out may be especially complex in the software context, because software
manufacturers cannot foresee the kinds of new software that will interact with their own in the
future.
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beyond the scope of this paper. Among other things, the Court
overlooked the problems its decision creates in the case of operating
systems such as Windows, because operating systems-even more so
than other types of software-are specifically intended to serve as
platforms to be adapted or altered by the user in order to meet her
unique needs. The Court also ignored the fact that once an integrity
right is recognized, it will apply down through the entire chain of
distribution unless a specific license to alter the program would be
granted, because, as the Gilliam court made clear, "a grantor [the
OEM] may not convey greater rights than it owns."' 32 Naturally, no
such license is included in the Windows end-user license agreement.
Thus, if the rule created by the Court were to be followed to its
ultimate conclusion, end-users of Windows would not be allowed to
install alternative "shells" on Windows, a result that even Microsoft
never contemplated.
All these flaws in the Court's decision are predicated on the
Court's basic error: the automatic application of Gilliam to a situation
that poses entirely different policy questions. The absolute lack of any
economic analysis of the right of integrity issue (its economic
justification, its viability in situations that raise anticompetitive
concerns, and its balancing with any anticompetitive effects it may
have) is not explained in the decision. This lack of analysis seems
particularly peculiar when compared with the painstakingly long
analysis of the other issues that were argued before the Court.
Whatever the reason for this, if the rule declared by the court were to
be followed, it would exact an unnecessary welfare toll without
providing any real social benefit.
As for the consequences of the court's decision on the specific
case before it, the recognition of a right of integrity has completely
skewed the Court's antitrust analysis of Microsoft's licensing
restrictions. This is not to say that Microsoft should be forever barred
from contracting for integrity protection with the OEMs; the
foregoing analysis suggests that a right of integrity would not be
welfare enhancing in the software context because, among other
things, contracting would be the more cost-effective way of optimally
protecting the integrity of software. However, a contract for integrity
protection is just that, and its antitrust analysis should be identical to
that of any other contractual provision. If the restrictive provisions
have an anticompetitive effect, as the Court found they do, they ought
to have been upheld only if Microsoft could show that they are
132. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21.
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nevertheless justified because they serve a legitimate business
purpose that counterbalances their anticompetitive effects.
What kind of justifications could Microsoft point to? For this we
need to go back to Hansmann & Santilli's analysis of the economic
justification for the right of integrity. As demonstrated by that
analysis, Microsoft would have had to show that the alterations made
to Windows would have had an adverse effect on Microsoft's
reputation. To prove this, Microsoft would not only have had to show
that the alterations would have undermined the "quality and
consistency" of Windows, as it attempted to do, but also that the
deterioration in the quality and consistency of Windows would have
an adverse effect on Microsoft, rather than on the OEMs that were
making the alterations. In fact, the Court found that Microsoft had
failed to prove any loss of quality to Windows, as well as any adverse
effect such loss would have had on Microsoft's reputation. The
Court's conclusion from this finding should therefore have been just
the opposite from its actual decision: Microsoft should never have
been allowed to prevent OEMs from altering Windows in a way that
would have been beneficial to them.
CONCLUSION
We are witnessing a judicial trend towards expansion of IP
protection to post-sale and licensing restrictions, coupled with some
calls from academia to freely allow such restrictions. Unfortunately,
this trend has not been based on rigorous economic analysis of the
costs associated with the expansion of IP rights, costs that may be
especially high when the restrictions raise anticompetitive concerns.
Without a strong analytic background, courts struggle to develop
doctrine on the basis of intuitions. These attempts may occasionally
succeed, as they have at least to a limited extent in Gilliam, a case
whose result is at least arguably correct. Nevertheless, as the Gilliam
case demonstrates, even successful applications cannot offer a sound
doctrinal backbone when they are loosely based on haphazard
analogies. Without sound reasoning, subsequent decisions will tend to
misapply the rule. When this happens in an area of great economic
importance, as was the case in Microsoft, such misapplication can
exact a severe toll on social welfare.
This paper points out the risks associated with expanding IP
protection to post-sale and licensing restrictions, and calls for a more
reasoned approach in future analysis of such restrictions. It offers an
example of the kind of analysis that must be applied before courts
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allow a restriction to be recognized as an IP matter, rather than a
contractual issue. More specifically, it suggests a new methodology
for determining the applicability of a right-of-integrity type restriction
to new subject matter. In doing that, this paper attempts to take the
first steps on the road towards a comprehensive analysis of IP-related
restrictions and their legal and economic consequences.
* * *
